This article analyses thei deological matrix of the so-called right-wing populist movements,which was developed by AlaindeBenoist, the founderofthe NouvelleDroite in France.The ideology of theNew Right breaks with two dogmas of the old fascism:racism and the abolition of democracy.DeBenoist replacesracism with ethnopluralismand aims at ar adicalr eform of democracy.I nspired by the model of Athenian polis, de Benoist propagates the concept of an "organic democracy" based on ethnic homogeneity.Thus, the idea of pre-statehuman rights is criticized as ideological productofChristianity and the Enlightenment. Fort hat reason,t he ideology of the NewR ight has not only an illiberal but also aneo-pagan agenda. Forthat reasonChristian alliances with new-rightist movements involvethemselves in ideological contradictions.T he perversions of Christian ethics through an ethnic concept of democracy can be illustrated by Victor Orbµns foundation of an "illiberal state" in Hungary.Thus,this ideology aims to erode both the democratic constitutional state and the universalistic dimension of Christian ethics.
Introduction
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama celebratedliberal democracy as the endpoint of the ideological evolution of mankind (Fukuyama1989). Afew decades later,liberal democracyi sc hallenged not only in somep eripheries but 1T he present article is arevised and extended versionofSchelkshorn 2017. even in the core states of the so-called Western world.Since the victory of Donald Tr ump,even the democratic order of the United Stateshas been shattered.
TheM exican philosopher Leopoldo Zea,h owever, already criticized Fukuyamase uphoria on liberal democracyi nt he early 1990s.A ccordingt oL eopoldo Zea, Fukuyama ignoredt he most important historicall esson of the 20 th century, namely that the liberal world-order provoked the emergence of fascism that threw the whole of mankind into ahumanitarian catastrophe.Inthe light of Fukuyamasu ncritical over-emphasis of liberal democracy,t he 20 th centurya ppears only as alost century (unacenturíaperdida) (Zea 1996, pp.13-22) . In fact, at the beginningofthe 21 th centuryneo-liberal globalizationand intensified migration flows have led to the emergence of new rightwing parties in almost all western countries,includingLatin America (Heinisch /Holtz-Bacha /Mazzoleni 2017) Therise of the New Right, however, is not acompletely new event in recent history. TheF ront National, the first important New Rightparty in Europe, was founded in 1972. In the mid-1980s,Jörg Haider,the head of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), became as econd leading figure of the New Righti nE urope. Meanwhile,the spirit of the New Right has crossed the limits of right-wing populist parties,spreading its ideological topics into the middle-classes and civil society includingC hristian milieus.I np resent times, Viktor Orbµn, aC hristian Democratic politician and membero ft he Reformed Church, is generally acknowledgedasthe new political leader of the New Right in Europe.
Christians arento nly uninvolved spectators or blind followers of the New Right.Jörg Haiderwas already supported by ultra-conservative bishops.Nowadays conservative Catholics as well as evangelical Protestants are engaged in the Alternative for Germany (AfD).V iktor Orbµnholds astronga lliance not only with the Reformed Church, but with the Catholic episcopate,t oo.J aroszlaw Kaczý nski, the Leader of "Law and Justice" (PiS), expressed his gratefulness to Radio Maryja movement without whose support the electionv ictory in 2015 would not have been possible. 2 In public media as well as in social sciences extreme rightwing parties are usually analyzed as "populism", referringmainly to certain strategies,for instance friend-enemy scheme,separation of society into the "true people" and the "corrupt elite", simplification of complex facts,the mobilization of resentments,etc. (Canovan 1981; Mudde 2007; Müller 2016, pp.11f.) . In this view populistparties are considered as political movements withoutathick ideological orientation, adapting political issues mainly to the fluctuating moods of the "people" (Taggart 2000; P riester 2012) .T he rise of populismss eems to react only to ac risis of representationw ithin the hegemonic liberal political culture,acrisis which is hiddenbythe so-called mainstream media. 2F or detailed analyzes of the relationshipsb etween Christian groups and new rightest movements in Europe and the USA see Marzouki /McDonell /Roy 2016. Thepublic image of populism as an almost unideological political movement, however, underestimates the political agenda of the New Right, which aims at an erosion and ultimatelyauthoritariantransformation of liberal democracy. Thus, Victor Orbµnswell-known proclamation of an "illiberalstate" clearly expresses the ideological focus of the new rightest movements despite their political differences.
Theq uestion of the relation between populistp arties and ac risis of representation presupposes an accurate analysis of theirideological orientations. Thus, in the following sketches Iwould mainly analyze the ideological matrix of the New Right referring to Alain de Benoist, the founderofthe Nouvelle Droite in France (chapter 1). In asecond step,Iwill examine the ideological orientation of Fidesz as the most important example of aC hristian New Right politicst oday and its contradictionswith Christian ethics (chapter 2). In afinal remark Iwill indicate deficits in contemporary politicalphilosophieswhich undermineastrong secular criticismofthe New Right.
The Ideological Matrix of the NewRight:Alain de Benoist
As political analysts often emphasize,populist parties pursue quite different social and political objectivesd ue to the historya nd heterogeneous members of these parties.For instance,the FN and the FPÖ were originally succesorparties of former fascist groups.H aving evolved to the largest workersp artiesi nt heir countries,F Na nd FPÖ adopteds ome socialist themes in their programs.B y contrast, the German AfD originally founded by conservative liberals promotes primarily neoliberal economic viewsc riticizingt he socialist agenda of the FN. Populist parties differ also in the foreign-policy interests.S ince VictorO rbµn intensified the relationships to Putin, the Polish government still maintained a distant attitudetowards Russia.
Despite all the different political issues,the so-called right-wing populist parties share acommon ideological matrix which modifies their conservative,liberal or socialist orientations in ac ertainw ay.T he main ideological elements of the broad spectrum of new rightest movements can be found in the philosophy of Alain de Benoist, the master mindofthe Nouvelle Droite in France.Inspired by Antonio Gramsci, de Benoistaimed to break the cultural hegemonyofleft and liberalthinking in the Western World. Therefore de Benoist didntfoundanew party but aforumfor right-wing intellectuals,the "Groupement de rechercheet detudes pour la civilisation europØenne" (GRECE) in 1968. As de Benoistdeclares in his "Manifeste pour une renaissanceeuropØenne (1999)" the Nouvelle Droite "is not apolitical movement, but athink-tank and schoolofthought" (de Benoist /Champetier2012,p.11).
AccordingtodeBenoist, the New Rightmust dissolve itself from two dogmas of fascism,concretely the biological racism and the option for aviolent destruc-tion of democracy. Thus,the New Right replacesracism with ethnopluralismand aims at aradical reform of democracy.
In the early 1960s, Alain de Benoist himself publiclyjustified racismand the superiority of the white race in his early neo-fascist period (Taguieff 1994, pp.111-122-135; Böhm 2008, pp.160-172) . Thee mphatic claim to abandon the racist dogma of "old" fascism marks acertain break within his intellectualbiography. Indeed, de Benoist distanced himself from all the three elements of racism:the postulate "of qualitative inequalities between races,such that, on the whole,one can distinguish races as either superior or inferior;that an individualsvalue is deduced entirely from the race to which he belongs; and that race constitutes the centraldetermining factor in human history.These three postulates may be held together or separately.All threeare false." (de Benoist /Champetier2012, p. 33; cf. de Benoist1974-75) . At the sametime de Benoist refuses the cosmopolitanism of the enlightenment, because its abstract universalism ignores the integrity of other cultures.Inaddition, modern cosmopolitanism served as ideological justification for imperial expansion and "its subsequent attempt of convert the rest of the world:i nt he past, to its religion (the Crusades);y esterday,t oi ts political principles (colonialism), and today,t oi ts socialm odel (development) or its moral principles (human rights)" (de Benoist /Champetier2012, p. 28). Thus,criticism of imperialism and globalization are no longer amonopolyofleft wing intellectuals, but acore feature of representatives of the New Right, too.
Beyond racism and abstract antiracism the New Right defends a" differentialist anti-racisms"acknowledging the irreducible plurality and Otherness of cultures (de Benoist /Champetier2012, p. 34). De Benoistviewsmodernworld as a"pluriversum,amultipolarorder in which greatcultural groups find themselves confronting one anotheri nashared global temporality" 3 ."Rather,the struggle against racism is waged by the refusal of both exclusion and assimilation:neither apartheid nor the melting pot" (de Benoist /Champetier2012, p. 34) . Despite his break with racismdeBenoist continuessome perspectivesofhis early neo-fascist thinking.J ust as the races in his early thinking also cultures should coexist in spatial separation. Thus,the critique of immigration is reaffirmed within the new culturalist framework (de Benoist /Champetier2012, p. 34 f.).
3D eBenoist /Champetier ,p .29. Theterm "pluriversum"originally introducedby William James was adopted by Max Scheler in his early philosophyofwar (Scheler 1982) Like de Benoist Schelerd escribed global modernity as ap lurality of co-existing civilizations.IncontrasttoHegel andlater Husserl who justified the Europeanization of the whole world, the early Scheler negates cultural penetrations.The influences of European culture on China maintained only on the surface,asScheler stresses with Ku Hung-Ming (Scheler 1982, p. 172 f; Hung-Ming 1911) . As is well known Scheler corrected his early philosophy of separated civilizationsinhis late essay about "the age of adjustment" ("Das Weltalter des Ausgleichs"), developingt he visiono fr eciprocalp enetration between eastern and western cultures (Scheler 1976) .
Thed efense of the plurality of cultures is intimately linkedw ith the newrighted project of aradical reform of democracy,which is guided by the model of the Greek Polis and the egalitarian order of German and Scandinavian tribes (de Benoist, 2011, p. 16 f.) . Theemergence of populist movementsisoften analyzed as asymptomofarepresentational crisis in democracies in the Western world.The New Right, however, not only tries to closet he gap between established governmental parties and the people but questionst he idea of parliamentaryd emocracy itself.Alain de Benoist explicitlydenies the usualpreference of "modern" representative democracies suited to great populations over them odelo f direct democracy in antiquity."In this respect, to argue that Greek democracy was only ad irect democracy because it encompassed as mall numbero fc itizens is again rather simplistic. Direct democracy need not be associated with al imited numberofcitizens.Itisrather primarily associated with arelatively homogeneous people conscious of what makes it such. Theeffective functioning of Greek democracy,a sw ell as of Icelandic democracy,w as first and foremostt he result of cultural cohesion and aclear sense of shared belonging" (de Benoist 2011, p. 28) .
Favoring traditions of direct participation, Alain de Benoist adopts as econd element from ancient democracies.The Athenian democracy was based on ethnic homogeneity,which was ensured by the Periclean Citizenship Law of 451 B.C. ,as de Benoist explicitlyi ndicates. "The most essential feature of citizenship was onesorigin and heritage:Pericles was the son of Xanthippus from the deme of Cholargus.From 451 B.C. one had to be born of an Athenian mother and father in order to become acitizen" (de Benoist 2011, p. 23) . Farbeyond historical reminiscences the ethnical basis of ancient democracy serves as aguidelinefor adeep reorientation of moderndemocratic states."Democracy was rooted in anotion of autochthonous citizenship,w hich intimately linked its exerciset ot he origins of those who exercisedit" (de Benoist2011, p. 24). Attacking liberal democracy,the principles of freedom and equality arentbased on pre-state human rights but on ethnically anchored civil rights,asdeBenoist frankly declares. "Liberty" means "first and foremost the liberty of the people,f rom which the liberty of citizens follows. In other words,itisthe liberty of the people (or of the city)that lays the foundations for the equality of individual political rights, which is to say the rights enjoyedbyindividuals as citizens" (de Benoist 2011, p. 25) .
Against this background liberalism as "the dominant ideologyofmodernity" becomes the "Main Enemy" of the New Right (de Benoist 2012, p. 14). Then, liberalism dissolves human beings from all forms of organic society.DeBenoists criticismofthe liberal ideologydoes not referonly to the social atomism of the homo eoconomicus who seeks only his own advantage.Furthermore,deBenoist attacksalso the idea of human rights as adangerousideology which undermines the priority of collective identities.T he idea of pre-statalhuman dignity is criticized as an ideological productofChristianity and the Enlightenment. Thus,de Benoist denies modern liberalism, precisely ademocratic state based on human rights,a sasecularization of Christian individualism and abstract enlightened universalism." Modern democracyo rganises atomised individuals into citizens, primarily viewing them through the lens of abstract egalitarianism.Ancient democracy was based on the idea of organic community;modern democracy, as an heir to Christianity and the philosophy of the Enlightenment, on the individual. Themeaningofthe words city, people, nation and liberty radically changes from one modelt ot he other" (de Benoist 2011, p. 28) . In this perspectived e Benoist proposes thec oncept of an "organic democracy"a sa na lternative to liberals tate.F or the strength of ad emocracy depends on the "existence of a relatively homogeneous people". "The closerthe members of acommunity are to one another, the more likely they are to have common sentiments,i dentical values,and the same way of viewing the world and socialties,and the easieritisfor them to make collectivedecisions concerning the commongood withoutthe need for any formofmediation" (de Benoist 2011, p. 28) . Strengthening the homogeneous nationalcommunity,the idea of an "organic democracy" reaffirms the old idea of fraternity purified from Christian and transnational elements." Fatherlands are the natural settings of fraternity whenever this is used to express ones duty towards those who share his heritage.T he homeland is the naturalf ramework of fraternity,wheneveritexpresses our duties to those who share acommon heritage with us" (de Benoist 2011, p. 99) .
Struggling for cultural hegemony of right-wing thinking,Alain de Benoist built up an international network of right-wing intellectuals.T hus,d eB enoist held contact with Armin Mohler, the author of "Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland1 918-1932 Deutschland1 918- " (1949 ,w ho tried to separate conservativism from Nazism like the NouvelleDroite in France. 4 Since 1991 de Benoistalso cooperates with Alexander Dugin, the main ideologue of neo-Eurasianism in Russia (Camus 2015) , to mention just two expamples.
Ther elationshipsb etween de Benoist and right-wing populist parties are a complex field.Certainly,the New Right parties in Europedontsimply adopt de Benoistsidea of an organic democracy. Their ideological orientationsresult from powers truggles between different groupsw ithin the parties.F urthermore each right-wingpopulist partyarticulatesits own idea of "national homogeneity" reaffirming and modifying local illiberal ideologies of the 19 th and 20 th century. Nonetheless,deBenoistsconcept of an "organic democracy"obviously servesas atheoretical matrix for New Rightparties offering acertainframework for their diffuseideological orientations.
4A rmin Mohler, aS wiss citizen, who entered into the Waffen-SS 1942, offers a comprehensive panorama of illiberal political traditions after the First World War. Mohlersw ork, originally ad issertation under Karl Jaspers and still published in new editions,became an important sourcebook for new rightest movementsinthe German speaking world. See Weiß 2017, pp.39-63. TheN ouvelle Droite was the modelfor the German New Right, especially of the "Thule-seminary" (Weber 1997, pp.31-37) .
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Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 Thed irect and indirect influence of de Benoist on political parties can be observed in the Front National and the Austrian Freedom party.T he FN was foundedbyneo-fascist movements (volunteers of NS organizations, collaborators of the regime of MarØchal Petain, supporters of the OASinAlgeria et al.). The spectacular rise of FN began with its ideological change whichwas mainly influenced by the think-tankso ft he New Right. "This change in the ideological framework of the party wentalong withthe decision takenin1978 to put immigration at the core of its political platform,renouncingthe neo-fascists references in favor of acontemporary populist approach." (Roy 2016, p. 83) . Although the new FN could not be understood without the ideology of the New Right, de Benoists till kept ac ertain distance to FN,e ven sharply criticizing its primitive theses and polemics (Taguieff1994, p. 225; Böhm 2008, pp.122-125) .
Thei deas of de Benoist indirectly influenced also the ideological turn of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)i nitiated by Jörg Haideri n1 986. After having marginalizedliberal groups within the FPÖ,Jörg Haider proclaimed an ethnical reorientation in politics:"If politics is not built on ethnic principles,mankind has no future at all." ( Haider 1994, pp.224) In the 1990s, Haider successfully perfected the strategies of the New Right-politics.Like the populist parties today, the FPÖ staged itself in the public sphere as the uniquevoice of the "people" whichis exclusively defined by the FPÖ itself.T hus,H aiderd enounced political competitors as enemies of the state and even attackeddemocratic institutions,above all the constitutional court. Avant-garde artists such as Elfriede Jelinek, the later Nobel Prize Laureatefor literature, socialist politicians and left-wing intellectuals were denounced as enemies of the Austrian "people"i np ublic pamphlets.T he slogan of the referendum of the FPÖ againstforeigners in 1993 "Austria first" was adopted by alot of populist parties meanwhile.
Jörg Haider even propagated the foundation of the Third Republic in Austria (Haider 1994, pp.189-249) ,aproject which can be compared with de Benoists vision to transform theliberalstate into an organic democracy. Forthis purpose Haiderd emanded to supplement the catalogueo ft he human rights witht he ethnically defined" right to homeland" ("Recht auf Heimat")i nt he Austrian constitution (Haider 1994, pp.86-106) .The "righttohomeland", however, is not amere supplement to the catalogue of the human rights,because it reduces the universal dimensions of human rights into ethnicd efined citizenr ights as de Benoist propagates.F urthermore,t he "right to homeland" understood as conservation of ethnic homogeneity paves the way for an authoritarian state.I na liberaland pluralistic democracy, "national identity" is thesubject of public debatesb ased on certain human rights,e specially the freedomo fe xpression and assembly.Since different groupshave differentviewson"national identity", the "right to homeland" secured by public authority unavoidably represses social pluralism. Fort his account, instead of adapting themselvest ot he fluctuating moodsofthe people,new rightest movements already know "the" will of "the" people,and, above all, who really belongs to the people.
At this point we can observe the dialectical role of the New Right in the politics of representation. On the one hand, the New Rightemergesasareaction against the representational crisis in modern societies during the last decades.O nt he other hand, promoting anew politics of representation, the New Right produces a deep crisis of political representation. Claimingtorepresent the "people",the socalled populist parties paradoxically excludes all groups which dontbelong to the holisticcorpus of the "people" ("Volk"). This is the centralthesisofJ an-Werner Müllersapproachtopopulism whichcan be applied both to right-wing and left wing parties:"populists claim that they, and only they,representthe people […] Thepopulist core claim also implies that whoeverdoes not reallysupportpopulist parties might notbepart of the proper people to begin with." (Müller 2016, p. 20) In regard to right-wing populism Iwould like to specifyMüllersthesis.Inthe long run, right-wing populistparties aim at an organicdemocracy outlined by de Benoist.
In ordertore-construct modern liberal states into an organic democracy, the New Right meanwhile developed aset of political strategieswhich are inspired by de Benoist:strengthening direct democracythrough referendums;weakeningthe separation of power and the judicial institutions,s pecifically the Constitutional Court;f ostering cultural and ethnical homogeneity by state control over the media and cultural life;and not at least arestriction of immigration policy.
Thus,the ideology of the New Right tends to anew authoritarianism but not to asimple renewal of old fascism. Identifying the right-wing populist parties with Neo-fascism in public debatesi sacounterproductive strategy which mistakes their real ideological agenda and allows them to renounce critique as left-wing propaganda. Nonetheless,elements of the old fascism are not totally eliminated in the heterogeneous populistp artiesw hich consist of quited ifferentg roups,i ncludingneo-fascist milieus.Asiswell-known, Jean Marie Le Pen often expressed antisemitisma nd posed in question the historicity of the holocaust. And Jörg Haider defended members of the Waffen-SS and the employment policyoft he Nazis.N eo-fascist expressions of somem embers of populist parties, however, must be differentiatedf rom the ideological orientationsr ecorded in partyp rograms.
Viktor OrbµnsContradictory Synthesis between NewRight
Ideology and Christianity the liberal era after 1989 important industries and the financial sector came under the controlofforeign investors.In2008 the Hungarian people severely suffered under the financial crisis.T he GNP fell by 20 percenti no ne year;f amilies lost thousands of US-dollars within afew months. Hungarian companies controlonly 10 %ofthe industrial and financial economyofthe country. Theoverwhelming victoryofO rbµn2010 obviously was an eruptive reaction against the economic liberalism during the last decades. Victor Orbµn, however, did not just take amore protectionist course in economic politics,but usedthe two-thirds majorityfor aradical reconstruction both of Hungarian state and civil society.T he state media were brought under the controlofthe government. Theconstitutional court was disempowered. Themain projectofthe new government, however, was anew constitution, which had been enforced without agreements with oppositional parties,acoup,which was legally possible,but standsincontrast to the democratic ethos. Only aparty which understands itself as the authentic voice of the "people" is able to adopt an ew constitution beyond ab road consensus of all political groups.I n2 002, Orbµn alreadye xpressed his new-rightest thought in aw ell-known statement after his electoral defeat:"TheMotherCountry (Haza)cannot be in opposition!" (cited according to PØteri).
Thep reamble of the new constitution describes Hungary no longer as ar epublic,but as aChristian nation founded by the Holy Stephen. Afterthe national narrative which doesntmention the historical role of other groups as the Jews or the Roma, the constitution integrates acatalogue of human rights.Unlike other Western constitutions, which start with idealizing representations of the national history, too,t he new Hungarian constitution explicitly oblige the constitutional court to justify its decisions in the light of the nationalisticpreamble (Müller,2012, pp.28f.; Halmai 2014) . Thus the ethnic community defined only by one party becamethe normative basis of the whole state orderprior to the human rights.For this reason,the new Hungary promulgatedthe first constitution which was built on the core principle of the ideology of the New Right.Orbµnhimself underlined the ethnic roots of the Hungarian state on aspeech in the Ópusztaszeri n2012. "From the moment of our births,our seven tribes enter into an alliance,our StKing Stephen establishes as tate,o ur armies suffer ad efeat at the battle of Mohµcs,a nd the Tu rul bird is the symbol of national identity of the living,t he deceased and the yet-to-be-bornH ungarians." 5 Moreover, Orbµnp ublicly affirmed the priorityofthe ethnic community over humanrights,acore elementof the organic democracy of de Benoist. As Orbµnfranklystated in the Swiss journal "Weltwoche" (No 46/2015) ,the Europeanelites are only debatingabout "shallow and secondary topics.N ice things as human rights,p rogress,p eace,o penness, tolerance.Wedonot talk about freedom, we do not talk about Christianity,wedo not talk about the nation,a nd we do not talk about pride.B rutally said:W hat dominates the European public today is only European liberalblablaover nice, but secondary topics."
At this point the question arises,how it is possible that aChristian politician questions the universality of the human rights in the nameofethnicidentity which de Benoist justified with anew anti-Christian paganism. We can find an answer for the question in the speech of Orbµni nK ö tcse on the 5 th of September 2015, in which Orbµnexplainedthe opposition between liberal identity and identity as the most important ideological frontlinei np resent times;" if we fightw ell in this debate, to restore the prestigea nd appeal of national identity and Christian identity,i no ppositiont ot he liberal identity (Orban 2015)". Orbµns speech is explicitly ac ommentary to the new constitution,b ecause "the Hungarian constitution -adoptedatatime when an immigrationcrisis was still nowhere to be seen -issuperblysuited to strengthening this Christian and national identityin the eyes of all and in opposition to the ruling liberalidentitiesinEurope today" (ibid.).
Orbµnidentifies liberalismwith an egalitarian moral cosmopolitanism fostered by legal regimes of human rights.InaccordancetodeBenoist, humanrights are qualified as aset of particular values of Western culture,which has been violently imposed upon foreign peoples.The refugee crisis is one of the consequences of the missionary imperialism of Europe." After having proclaimed global, universal humanrights,having forcedour ideologyonthem and having elevated freedomof information above all else,having sent our celebritiesinto their homes, now we are surprised that they are knocking on our door" (ibid).
Tr ansforming the world into ag lobal village,l iberal cosmopolitanism endangers prosperity and self-assertiono fE urope.F or this reasonl iberal identity must be replacedbyabyChristian identity as Orbµnprogrammatically proclaims. Thecore of Christianidentity is defined by an ethics which differentiates moral responsibilities according to concentric spheres of social live:
" [W] e know that the liberal feelsresponsible for the whole world because they are agood person, everythinghappening in the world causes them pain, and their soul feels heavy with the burden.Inopposition to this approach, how does our identity stand up?Ithink that the Christian identity[ …] reveals to us acompletely clear order of importanceo r priority.First of all, we are responsible for our children, then for our parents. This comes before all else.Then come those with whom we live in our village or town. Then comes our country, and then everyoneelse may come." (Orbµn2015) Orbµncriticizes Christian circles to be eager to the liberalideology,too.Against Christian demandsf or humanitarian refugeep olitics,O rbµna ttackede ven Church officialswho are transforming Christian charity into apolitical principle. TheC hristian commandment of love refers only to the private space as Orbµn stresses.
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Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 Victor Orbµnsdefenseofthe "Christian identity" obviously mixes pagan and Christian elements into ahighly ambiguous synthesis.However,acritique of the contradictionsb etween the combination of New Right ideology and Christian ethics need furtherclarifications.
Firstly:From ahistorical viewpoint, the "liberal identity" attacked by Orbµnas abstract cosmopolitanism was originally aChristian idea. Admittedly,the ethics of global responsibility cannot be traced back to the Bible,but it was developed by Christian philosophiesinthe 16 th century.Accordingtothe famous parable of the Good Samaritan in Luke 10:25-37, Christiansare obliged to help people in need regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation. However,the Samaritan doesnt feel immediately responsible for the whole humankind. Forinstance,the victims of Roman imperialism were not subject to Christian responsibility in the earlyera of the church. Thei dea of concrete global responsibility was developedb yt he "School of Salamanca" during the Europeane xpansion since the 15 th century (Schelkshorn 2009, pp.205-298; Schelkshorn 2012) . Shocked by the imperial violence of the Spaniards in Peru, Francisco de Vitoria laid the foundation for the modern theory of international law,which containsnot only the right to travel and to trade,but also the righttomigration and even to become acitizen in aforeign country.I na ddition, reacting to the reports on human sacrifices of the Aztecs, Vitoria postulated to defend innocent men from unjustdeath even if they live far away from our own life world as auniversal moral obligation. Extending moral responsibility to the whole mankind,Vitoria paved the way for an ethics of global solidarity including humanitarian intervention whichs till is as ubject of controversies until now.
That means:The moral cosmopolitan condemned by Orbµnasliberal ideology originally was autopian visionofChristian philosophy of the 16 th century basedon the Stoic and biblical idea of the unity of humankind.N od oubt, Vitoriasc osmopolitanism was alreadycriticized by Christiantheologians,for instance by Luis de Molina in den 16 th century.H obbes completely rejected international law, which was theoretically founded again mainly by Kant (Cavallar 2011, pp.39-108) . Nonetheless,t he currenti nternationalc onventionso na syluma nd aliens however, restrictVitoriasChristian vision of anew world society (Cavallar2002).
Secondly,the doctrine of concentric spheres of moral duties opposed to "liberal cosmopolitanism" by Orbµno riginally can be found both withC icero and the Mencius.T he idea of ag radation of moral dutiesw as ac ritical response to the problemofexcessivedemands of universalistic morality and to an extreme egalitarianism. Forinstance,the Chinesephilosopher Mo Ti,who developedone of the first universalistice thics in China, propagated that we have the sameo bligationstoall men whether they were family members or foreigners.The ethics of Mo Ti was sharply criticized by Mencius who focused on the priority of familiar duties.Moral education has to start with the relationshipbetween the members of the family.However,the doctrine of differentspheres does not contradict ethical universalism. Both Cicero and Mencius advocate astep-wise expansion of moral responsibility,w hich primarily is appliedb yt he family and ultimately should encompass the whole of mankind. 6 In this sense the theory of concentric circles was adopted by Christian ethics, too.
Thirdly,the relationshipbetween Christianmorality and politics addressed by Orbµnisanextremely complexproblem that cantbesystematically treated in this context. Iw ould like to outline only one aspect:C ertainly,t he biblical commandment of love firstly is directed to Christians in their everyday and private life. In astrict sense Christian love (agape) isntamoral norm but agift or an effect of the divine grace.T hus it is impossible to deduce concrete political norms immediatelyf rom the Christian agape.F or instance,b iblical commands to respect foreigners surely foster moral sensibility for refugees;but they dontdispense us from searching for strategies to deal with the extremely complex refugee crisis in these present days.C ertainly,a ne thics of global responsibility has to take into account the limited capacitieso fs tatest hat accepta sylum seekers. Overall, we have to concede that nobody has all of the convincinga nswers to this great probleminthe early 21th century.
Theproblem with new right policies concerning migrationand asylum doesnt consist in articulating certain and neglectedp roblems but in the ethnically reduced view of the refugeecrisis as awhole.New right parties dontdiscuss difficult questions concerning the quantity of refugees and the limitation of the social institutions.The main aim of migration politics is to avoid any migration in order to protect the ethnic composition of the nation. Under the spell of an ethnic ideology even the moderate quoteofabout 1400 refugees was refused by Orban as an intolerable pressure from abroad.
Theq uestion of asylum is the pitfall for any universal ethics.T he exclusive focus on ethnic identity contradicts the universal claims of Christian ethics. Therefore Christiansengaged in the refugeecrisis must not agree in the strategies, but they will recognizec entral values of itso wn morality in the secular human rights conventions,including the conventions on asylum and aliens.Bytheway, those who transformed the Hungarian republic into aChristian state should not accuse Christian humanrights groups of ignoring the difference betweenprivate and political ethics.
6S ee Mencius 1970, p. 143 f; A7:"Tr eat with the reverence due to age the elders in your own family,sothat the elders in the families of others shall be similarly treated;treat with the kindness due to youth the young in your own family,s othat the youngi nt he families of others shall be similarly treated -dothis,and the kingdom may be made to go round in your palm […] Thelanguage shows how king Wensimply took his kindly heart, and exercised it towardsthoseparties. Thereforethe carrying out his kindness of heart by aprincewill suffice for the love and protection of all withinthe four seas,and if he do not carry it out, he will not be able to protect his wife and children."C f. also Opitz2 000, pp. .
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Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2 Fourthly:Alain de Benoist affirms and reverses Hegelsthesis that theFrench Revolution is based on the ethical universalism of Christianity. In the middle of the 20 th century Christian thinkers as Jacques Maritain laid important foundations for ap lural democracy and even the UN Declaration of Human Rights on the basis of the Christian doctrine of natural law.According to Maritain, the dignity of the human persontranscends historical communities based on ethnic descent.If the ethnic community obtainsaprincipal priority over the person, there is no bulwark against political totalitarianism.T he respect for the human person, however, does not negate the relative importance of national or ethnic forms of the community.L ike de Benoist, Maritain criticizes social atomism and laissez faire economy as liberalideologies (Maritain 1996, ch. I,3; IV, 4) . In contrast to de Benoist, however, Maritain affirms the universal horizon of the modern ideal of fraternity:Under the inspiration of the Gospelinhistory the "secular conscience has understood that in the temporal social and political order itself,n ot only is there civic friendship,a st he ancient philosophers knew it […]b ut this very friendship between citizens cannot prevail in actual fact within the social group unless astronger and more universal love,brotherly love,isinstalled in it, and civic friendship,itself becoming brotherhood, overflowsthe bounds of the social group to extendtothe entire human race" (Maritain 1945, p. 36) .
To sum up:T he synthesis between Christianity and the ideology of the New Right unavoidably negates core intuitions and innovative theological traditionsof Christian ethics.T he self-appointedd efenderso ft he Christian Occidentp aradoxically question the historical achievements of European culture,namely the democratic constitutional state and the human rights which were inspired by Christian Ethics as philosophersfrom Hegel to de Benoist himself acknowledged. Unabletorecognizetheir own Christianthoughts in the emancipatory ideals of modernity Christian alliances with the New Right appeal to old models of Christian authoritarian state continuing antimodernist traditions of the 19 th and early 20 th century. At this point Iw ould like to add ar eflection concerning the critique of de Benoist of the doctrine of human rights as imperialist ideology of the West. Without denyingthe abuse of human rights for geopolitical interests it must be rememberedthat the UN declaration of the human rights already emerged from some cross-cultural dialogues.T he erosion of amere Eurocentricfoundation of the human rights can already be observed in the philosophy of Maritain. In the 1940s Maritain still insisted that human rights cannot be founded outside Christian morality ( Martian 1944) . As chair of the French delegation of the UNcounsel, however, Maritain was confronted with different foundationsofhuman rights,especially by the Chinese and Indian thought. TheUNESCOsymposium documented abroad spectrum of views of human rights,containing "in itself an important object lesson" ( Maritain 1950, p. 12) . Not by chance, the Chinese member of the counsel, referred to Mencius (Chung-Shu Lo 1950, p. 187) . The cross-cultural experience provoked acertain shift of Maritainssocial philosophy differentiating between theoretical and practical levelsi nt he search for ac onsensus about human rights. 7 Although the "ideological contrast is irreducible and no theoretical reconciliation is possible" (Maritain 1950, p. 13) 
Final Remarks:Some Challenges for an Ethical Critique of the NewRight
TheNew Right outlined by Alain de Benoist refuses the universality of the human rights as an ideology of Christianity and Enlightenment.T herefore,C hristian alliances with new-rightest movements involve themselves in ideological contradictions.The ideology of the New Right, however, is highly ambiguous.Onthe one hand, de Benoist breaks with old fascism;onthe otherhand, he restores the priorityo fa ne thnic concept of the "people"( "Volk"). While appealing to the great idealsofthe FrenchRevolution their universalistic claims are eroded by the ethnic concept of fraternity which restricts the pluralism in modern societies in a dangerous way.S ince New Right parties engage themselves in the democratic competition playingeven the language game of democracyand "human rights", 7M aritain 1950, p. 10 f. :" Ia mq uite certain that my way of justifying belief in the rights of man and the idealofliberty,equality and fraternity is the only way with afirm foundation of truth.This does not prevent me from being in agreement on these practical convictions with people who are certain that their way of justifying them, entirely different form mine or opposed of mine, in its theoretical dynamism, is equally the only was foundedupon truth." 8A ccording to Maritain the different foundationsofthe human rights can be divided into two main schools,o nt he one hand theories of "Natural Law", on theo ther hand theories, which interpret human rights as "relative to the historical development of society,and are themselves constantly variable and in astate of flux" (Maritain 1950, p. 13) . 9C f. Maritain 1950, p. 10:" it is necessary to make the appropriate distinction between the rational justificationsi nvolved in the spirituald ynamism of ap hilosophic doctrine or religious faith, and the practicalc onclusions which, although justified in different ways by different persons,a re principles of action with ac ommon ground of similarity for everyone." the authoritarian agenda of their political aims often remains hiddenf or great parts of the people.T hus,t he regime of Orbµna nd the Polish PiS reveal the authoritarian politics of the New Right.
Ethical criticism of the New Right, however, is not only confronted with its hidden agenda but traced in the complexhistory of human rights itself.Finally I would like to briefly hint at someofthe problems.
In the French Declaration in 1789, humanand citizenrights build an ambiguous unity.For that reason,the universalclaims of the human rights were reduced in a certain way during the 19 th and early2 0 th century.A fter the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy huge masses of stateless persons revealedt he painfulr eductiono ft he human rights to citizen rights in the constitutional regimes of European states.Shocked by the NS-barbarianism the assembly United Nations reaffirmedemphatically the universal claims of the human rights.T he UN Declaration as such is am orald eclaration which had to be implementedb yl egal frameworks, both national and international, in the Post-war era. Forthat reason liberalc onstitutions of the Western world contain ac omplex mixture of citizen rights and transnational human rights.Liberal theories of democracy donttotally dissolve the "nation" by atomistic individualism. Thedebate between liberals and communitarians in political philosophy judged different constellationsb etween nation, state and human rights.E ven Jürgen Habermas doesnte liminate the concept of "nation"inhis philosophy of right (Habermas 1997, 128-191) . At this point we can specify the ideological thrust of new-righted movements and parties: TheN ew Right dissolvest he tense balance between human rights,s tate and nation in favor to an ethnic concept of nation. In addition, the liberal idea of humanr ightsk nows not only individual, but also collective rights,w hich are restricted to minority groups.Thus,the New Righttransposes minority rights on the legal order of the society as awhole.
Thec onfrontation with the New Right, however,c annot be restricted to political philosophy in as trict sense of the term. As de Benoist denies the universality of human rights,aradical critique of the New Rightisfaced with the search for arationaljustification of universal ethics.The currentphilosophical debates in political philosophy and socials ciences are dominated by postmodern, poststructuralist, non-foundationalist discourses which de-construct problematic universalistic paradigms withoutconstructivefoundations of universal ethics.For this reason,p hilosopherso ft he New Right use not only Gramsci for their own ideology but also Foucault and elements of differentialist culturalism. Of course, poststructuralist and non-foundationalist philosophiesoffer sharp instruments to criticize the holisticv iew of an organic democracy. Nonetheless,c onstructive justificationsofuniversal ethics still remain aneglectedand sometimes even an eliminated field in contemporary philosophies.
Michel Foucault distinguished between two families of founders,o nt he one hand philosophieswhich lay the foundation stoneand build up,onthe other hand philosophies which dig and open aspace for new forms of thinking (cf.F oucault
